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ABSTRACT 
The  paper analyses the  role of fiscal policy in  the  restoration of 
internal  and external  macroeconomic  equilibrium  snd in achieving  structural 
adjustment  i.e. major changes in the patterns  of sectoral and intertemporal. 
resource  allocation,  The  focus  is  on  developing and  new  industrial 
countries in need of both  stabilisation  and structural adjustment.  The 
external  transfer problem and  the  associated internal  fiscal and  real 
resource transfer  problems are analysed with special emphasis on possible 
causes for  the breakdown of  the  internal  and external transfer processes. 
The concepts of national and public sector solvency are  used to evaluate 
the  mutual consistency  and feasibility  of fiscal,  financial and monetary 
plans.  Special attention is  devoted to  the  links  between  the  fiscal 
deficit and inflation  and to the inflation  tax, 
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The  processes  of stabilisation  and structural  adus:rnenz  develipng 
countries  and  the  fiscal  policy  options  that  are  a:alabLe  can  be 
understood  only  by recognising  the often  extreme  in:tial  condit:ons  facing 
many  of  the  countries  concerned.  These  initlal  condLttcns  are 
macroeconomic disequilibrium,  both internal  and  external,  and structural 
disequilibrium 
Macroeconomic  disequilibrium  is a syndrome  containing  many or ros: of 
the  following ingredients  (See  eg. Ahamed r1986]  Dents  and  Petri 
:1987J  and Sachs  :l9B7.  A large  (and often  unsustainable)  public sector 
financial deficit.  A large  stock of  external  debt  often public or 
be—facto publicly guaranteed)  and severely  restricted  further access to 
external  credit on  commercial terms,  A history  of  capital  flight, 
resulting in a stock of external  assets that  is beyond the  reach of the 
duestic fiscal authorities.  A large  incipient  current  accourt deficit 
scmetimes  repressed  by  external  credit rationing  and by forecgn exchange 
controls  imposed by the domestic  authorities.  An overvalued  real exchange 
rate.  A high,  although sometimes  partially  repressed,  rate of  t?flation 
and significant  recourse  to the inflation  tax as a source  of public sector 
revenue,  A large  internal  public debt (in  the more advanced developing 
countries)  competing  for  scarce  domestic savings  in a generally  repressed 
domestic financial  system.  A narrow  and often  inequitable  and cneffcccent 
public  sector  revenue  base.  Real wages  in excess  of market—clearing  levels 
(and frequently  highly index—linked)  in the formal or the urban sector  and 
widespread  unemployment  and underemployment  of  labour, 
Structural  disequilibrium  refers  to the need for significant  changes  in 
the patterns of reource  allocation,  production  and absorption;  for major 
changes  in the modus operandi  of important  markets,  including  the domestic financial  markets,  the  foreign  exchange  racket "and the  terra  of rrivate 
access  to external credit)  ,  the  domestic labour  rarket and  the  doreatic 
goods  markets:  for  far—reaching  changes  in the  system  of property rights. 
rules,  regulations  and  laws  that  govern  production,  exchange  and 
distribution  and for changes  in the size and scope  of the tasks  performed 
by the public  sector. 
These  twin  disequilibria,  which  often  interact  and  reinforce  each 
other,  tend to occur  against a background  of mass poverty,  rapid  population 
growth,  and  major  social,  cultural  and  political  transformations. 
Political  stability is  often in doubt,  both as  regards  the  survival of 
incumbent  administrations  and  as  regards  the  viability  of  the  very 
institutions  of  government.  Credible  precommitmenta  to  any  long—term 
economic  strategy are  hard to come-by  in such an environment.  Scarce 
administrative  and  managerial  skills create  further obstacles  to the design 
and implementation  of  economic  reforms. 
Many of  the  diaequilibria  and policy  'dilemmas  just referred to have 
been encountered also  in  the  industrial countries,  The  USA  today  is 
characterised by  unsustainable  fiscal  and  external  current  'accoumc 
deficits.  Hyperinflations  occurred  in  Austria,  Germany,  Hungary and Poland 
in  the  l920s.  Many Western Eurcpean economies  have  been diagnosed as 
suffering during the  l970s  and  lPSOs  from a whole  array  of structural 
rigidities,  sometimes referrable  to collectively  as  "Eurosclerosis",  that 
prevent  a full  utilisation  and efficient  (re)allocation  of resources. 
The range  and severity  of the stabilisation  and structural  adjustment 
problems  faced  today  by  e.g.  the IMP's  IS highly  indebted  countries1  and by 
a large  number  of sub—Saharan  African  countries2  are such,  however,  that a 
fresh  restatement ;nd adaptation of conventional macroeconomic analysis 
focussed  on these  countries'  problems  seem  warranted. This paper  is both selective  and eclectic  in its  coverage and  is only 
intended as  a catalyst for  a wider—ranging  and deeper discussion  of  the 
issues (see Suiter  1986)  for  an analysis focussed on developing  country 
responses  to a range  of external  shocks).  The variety  of economic  systems, 
stages of  economic development,  problems  and  policy  issues  among  the 
developing and new  industrial  countries  is  such,  that  it  is  very hard 
indeed to  find a useful middle ground between the  Scyfla of ninety—odd 
book—length  country studies  and a dozen  exhaustive  comparative  analyses  and 
the  Charybdis  of a—historical,  institution—free  abstractions,  Section 2 
cowers  the  external  and internal  transfer  probLems.  Section  3  considers 
possible causes for the  breakdom of  the  internal  and external transfer 
processes.  Section 4  deals  with national solvency and  Section  5  with 
government  solvency.  n Section  6 the  inflation  tax is considered  in some 
detail  and in Section  7  a recent  quantitative  approach  used by the ''orld 
Bank  to evaluate the  consistency  of certain aspects  of  a  goverrznerit's 
fiscal,  financial  and monetary  strategy  is evaluated. 
2.  Fiscal policy  and the external  and internal  transfer problems 
To  reduce the  external  current  account  deficit  or  to  increase  the 
surplus is  to  increase  the  external transfer.  To realise  this increased 
transfer of real purchasing  power to  the  rest of the  world an  internal 
reallocation  real  resources  is  required:  production  and  productive 
resources  must be moved from the  non—traded goods  sector to  the  traded 
goods  sector,  i.e.  to the production  of exports  or import competing  goods. 
This requires  a decline  in the relative  price  of non—traded  goods  and,  if 
the country  has  any  international  market  power,  a  lower  relative price  of 
exports:  the  increased  external transfer can  be effected only through  a 
lower  real exchange  and a worsening  of the  terms  of trade.  It has by now become established (if  sloppy)  usage,  to  refer  to  the  increase in  the 
external  transfer  as the external  transfer.  I reuctantly adopt  this usage 
where it does not lead  to ambiguity  or error. 
In many developing  countries  (and  indeed  in such industrial  countries 
as the USA),  an unsustainable  or undesirable  external  deficit  tends  to be 
associated,  both  statistically  and  causally,  with  an unsustainable or 
undesirable  public  sector  financial  deficit,  The reduction  of the external 
deficit  in such cases  requires  the reduction  of the public  sector  deficit.3 
This can be  achieved  either through  cuts  in public  spending  or  through  an 
increase  in  public  sector  current  revenues:  taxes,  income  from  tariffs, 
public  sector  fees  and charges  etc.  The  expression (internal)  fiscal 
transfer  will  he used to refer  both to government  revenue  increases  and to 
public  spending  cuts.4 
The  fundamental  economy-seide financial  balances identity in equaticn 
(lab)  is a good plate  to start  an analysis  of the central  role  of fiscal 
policy in stabilisation  and structural  adjustment. 
5F IP+SG_ICA  (la) 
CA  TB +  —  i4[D*_R*J 
! 4(R*—D*)  (lb) 
S  is private  saving,  IF private  domestic  capital  formation,  0  public 
sector  saving,  1G public sector  domestic  capital  formation,  CA the current 
account  surplus  on  the  balance of payments and  TB  the  trade  balance 
surplus,  all  measured in terms  of real  CDF  units.  A*  is net foreign aid 
and other  current transfer  receipts  (such as  remittances)6,  D* the stock  of 
foreign  debt and R* the stock  of foreign exchange  reserves,  all denominated 
in terms  of foreigncurrency.  E is the nominal spot exchange  rate,  P the 
domestic  CDP deflator  and i* the foreign nominal  interest  rate. —0— 
It is sometimes  informative  to present  the financial  flows  :n acuatLons 
,lab)  "corrected or 'adjusted  for  asset  revaluations,  i.e.  for  cap:tal 
gains  and  losses  on outstanding  stoc.s  of assets nd Liabilities,  Th 
practice  this  means  correcting  for  the  effect of  inflation  or.  the  real 
value of  nominal  assets  and liabilities  and for the effect  of exchange  rate 
changes  and  inflation  on  the  real  value of foreign—currency—denominated 
financial  claims.  While  there are no issues of principle  involved  in  these 
measurement  or  presentational  conventions,  it  is  often helpful,  since 
economic  theory  specifies  preferences  and  production  technologies as 
defined  over real commodities,  to express  our uses and sources  of funds  in 
the  same  manner.  Similarly,  measuring  these  asset  revaluations—corrected 
stocks  and  flows  relative  to  some  "scale  variable"  such as trend)  real 
GD? is helpful  when the scale  variable Ls,  implicitly  or explicitly,  used 
to define a  solvency constraint  or  other  feasibility  constraint.  These 
issues are considered  further  in Sections  6 and 5. 
Equations  (2a,b) below introduce  the  distinction  between private and 
public external debt,  This  distinction  has  often  been  more  important 
formally  than  substantively.  The  debt  crisis  since  1982 has been a recent 
reminder  of the fact  that many de jure or formally  private  liabilities  are 
de facto publicly guaranteed.  Private  foreign  assets often  escape the 
grasp  of  the  domestic fiscal authorities,  Whether one  labels  this 
(privately  rational)  external  portfolio  diversification  or capital  flight, 
one of its consequences  is that the tax base becomes  narrower,  implying  the 
need for higher tax rates  on the remaining  tax base,  increased  recourse to 
seigniorage  (the inflation  tax) or increased  borrowing. 
Private and  public  saving  are defined  in (2a,b) 
ED*  (2a) gO  + T  A*  —  —  i*  (D*-R*) — CC  (2b) 
Q  is domestic income or product;  C  is the  cash return on  the public 
sector  capital  stock;  i is the nominal  interest  rate on domestic—currency— 
denominated  public  debt,  assumed  to  be held  only  by  the  domestic  privste 
sector  (the  Central  Bank is  included in the  consolidated public sector 
identity (2b)).  T is domestic  taxes  net of current  domestic trsnsfers  and 
subsidies;  Ct is  private  consumption  snd CC public  sector  consu.nption.  D*F 
is  private  external debt  (including  private  sector arreareges and  t*0 
public  external  debt (including  public  sector  arresrsges).  yore that 
0*  D*P + o*C  (3) 
The trade  balanoe surplus  is the exoess of the value of exports  over 
the  value of  imports.  Let  X  and M denote  export and  import  volume 
respectively  and  0M  and N  the  domestic currency prices of exports! 
imports and non—traded  gooda. 




X  Qx —(C*I+C*4)  (Se) 
and 
(Sb) 
Also,  ignoring  imported  raw materials  and imported  intermediate  inputs Q 
For simplicity,  we approximate  the GD? deflator.  P. with a Cobb—DoUglas 
weighted average  of the prices  of traded  goods  FT and non—traded  goods ?, 
where  m is the share  of non—traded  goods  in  GD?. 
1  - 
F 
The  traded  goods  GD?  deflator  is  also  approximated  with  a  cobb—Douglas 
weighted  average  of the prices  of exports  and imports  where  s  the share 
of importables  production  in the total  production  of traded  goods 
pl-  — X  (8j 
From (la,b)  and (2a,b)  we  obtain the  familiar  absorption  identities  in 
(9a,b)  that  the current  account  surplus  is the  excess of national  income 
over domestic absorption  and  that  the  trade  balance  surplus  equals  the 
excess  of domestic  income  over  domestic  absorption. 
Q +  —  i*  (D*—R*) — (CP÷IP+CG÷IG)  CA  9a 
Q 
—  (CP+lP+CG+IG)  — TB  (9b) 
From (la)  and  (9a)  we  see  that an  increase  in  the  current  account 
surplus  requires an  increase  in the  combined private and public sector 
financial  surpluses  or,  equivalently,  an  increase  in  national  income 
relative  to domestic (private plus public)  absorption.  This  underlines  the 
likelihood  of a  fiscal dimension  to a  current  account  improvement:  most 
models  of private  .consumption  behaviour  suggest  that,  holding constant 
taste,  technology  and external  parameters,  public revenue  increases  and/or spending  cuts will in  general  be necessary  and ouf  cier.r  to  increase  the 
sum of the  puolic  sector financial  surus and private  saving.  The  rain 
exceptions  are those  models of private  consumption  behaviour that exhibit 
debt  neutrality such  as  representative  agent  models  or  overlapping 
generations  models  with  operative  intergenerational  gift  and  becuest 
motives.  Such  models are  extremely  unlikely  to describe  accurately  private 
consumption  behaviour  in  developing  and  semi—industrial  countries. 
Ignoring them  in what follows,  and assuming  that public revenue  increases 
or  spending  cuts  do  not  boost  private  capital  focation,  fiscal 
retrenchment will reduce  national absorption relative  to  national  income. 
Equation (Pa)  underlines  the  desirability of  achieving a  current 
account  improvement  via  an  increase  in  income rather  than  through  a 
reduction in  absorption.  Three channels  are potentially available  for 
this:  (1)  increased  domestic  output,  (2)  increased  foreign  aid and (3) a 
reduction  in foreign  interest  obligations,  either  by reducing  the  interest 
rate on  the external  debt  or by writing  don  the debt. 
A  boost  to  domestic  output,  Q, can  be  achieved  either  by  taking  up any 
slack  due  to deficient aggregate  demand or by fiscal or other measures 
aimed at boosting  aggregate  supply.  Since  output  and absorption  need not 
be behaviourally  independent  of each other,  it  is  essential  to  adopt  a 
general  equilibrium approach  when  evaluating  alternative policies  to 
improve  the  current  account.  E.g  successful supply—side  measures,  by 
raising  both current  and permanent  income,  can be expected to  stimulate 
private  consumption.  They may also induce a positive  response  of domestic 
private investment.  The net effect  on  the  current  account need not be 
positive,  absent  further measures  to restrain  absorption. 
Fiscal measures'  to  stimulate  output under conditions of  Keynesian 
excess  capacity  will involve  expansionary  actions  such as tax cuts,  public spending  increases  or expansionary  monetary  or credit  policy  measures that 
(subject  to well known qualifications  concerning  the  exchange  rate regime 
and the degree of international  capital  mobility)  are  likely  to worsen  the 
current  account. 
Increased  foreign aid  will  only improve  the  current account,  given 
output,  if some fraction  of the aid inflow  is not spent.  f the increased 
aid relaxes  a foreign  exchange  bottleneck  arid  if the  additional  external 
resources  are  dedicated  to the importation  of essential foreign  productive 
inputs,  it can  boost  supply,  To the  extent  that the  increased  volume of 
production does  not  generate a  matching increase  in  private  r  public 
spending,  this will improve  the current account. 
Exactly  the same  holds  as regards  the current  account  consequences  of a 
reduction  in external interest  payments.  The  one—for-one improvement  in 
the current  account  caused  by interest  rate  or debt relief  at 'iven levels 
of output and absorption,  will be augmented  by any positive  supply  response 
in countries  where  production  is foreign—exchange—contrained.  It will be 
correspondingly  diminished  by any positive  effect  of debt  relief  on public 
or  private  spending. 
Equation (9a)  also emphasises  that,  even if a reduction  in absorption 
is the current-account—improving  policy  of choice,  there  are still  a number 
of ways of skinning that  cat,  each  of which will have different  short—run 
and  long—run  supply  consequences  and  distributional  implications. 
Absorption  cuts can be aimed  at public  spending  or at private  spending  and, 
within each  of these  categories,  at consumption  or at investment.  Private 
spending  can be cut by raising  taxes  or  tariffs,  by cutting  subsidies  or by 
raising the  cost and/or  availability of credit to  the  private  sector. 
Taxing  imported  lxury  consumer  durables  will  have  very  different 
distributional  implications from cutting  subsidies  on  the  staple foods consuned mainly by the poor.  The distributional consecuences of  changes  in 
exhausti-ie  public  spending  (education, health etc)  may  be  as  irnoortant  as 
those  of  variations  in  transfer  avments  or  taxes,  Theu  should  be 
considered  together  with  the  allocatiue  consecuences  and,  in 
demand—constrained  sectors  of the  economy,  the  Keynesian,  cyclical output 
effects 
These  distributional  effects  of absorption—reducing  policy measures 
can be  reinforced or offset by  changes  in  the  distribution of  factor 
incomes  (wages  of different types  of  labour,  rental incomes  from  the 
osership  of  different types  of  land:  profits  accruing  to  the  owners  of 
different  types  of  capital and  rentier  incomes)  This  is  considered 
briefly  below  in Section  3. 
The  fiscal dimension of a  current  account  improvement  can  only be 
understood  properly  by recoising  that policies to influence  the  current 
account  are ipso  facto  concerned  with  the nation's  interremporal  allocation 
of  resources.  Intertemporal  relative  (shadow)  prices  such as  the  real 
interest rate,  the  rates of return on  other  assets and,  in  repressed 
financial  systems  with widespread credit  rationing,  both  the  ost  and 
availability of  credit will  play  a  central  role  in  the  transmission 
mechanism  between fiscal  policy  actions and current  account  outcomes.  Wnen 
e.g.  the domestic  financial  markets  are not perfectly  integrated  into with 
the global financial markets,  bond—financed  fiscal  tightening  will tend to 
result in  lower  domestic  real  interest  rates  or  less  severe  credit 
rationing,  Even when  domestic asset returns  are  fixed  by the  rest of the 
world,  the  nation's  solvency constraint and  that of  the  public sector 
(discussed  in Sections  4 and 5) imply  that fiscal  tightening  today implies 
fiscal  relaxation  (relative  to what otherwise  would have been the case)  in 
th  future. Equations  (4)  and  (5a.b)  bring out  the  static relative prce and 
resource  reallocation  dimensions  of a current  account  improvement.  In the 
short  run,  given  the foreign  interest  rate,  the net stock of external  debt 
and the  aid flow,  a current account  improvement  is  the  same thing  as a 
trade  balance  iriprovement.  A  trade  balance  improvement  requires  an 
increase  in  the  production of  tradeables  and/or  a  reduction  in  the 
absorption  of tradeables.  This  will in  general  require  changes  in the real 
exchange  rate  (the relative  price  of traded and non—traded  goods)  and,  if 
the country  in question  has  some international  market power,  in the  terms 
of trade  (the relative  price  of exports  and imports). 
Fiscal tightening (an  increase in  taxes  or a cut  in  public sector 
absorption)  will  almost  certainly  reduce  the demand  for non—traded  goods  at 
the  initial real exchange  rate.  Income  tax or indirect  tax  increases  will 
reduce  private consumption,  part of which will fall on non—traded  goods. 
Higher taxes  on profits  and tighter  private  sector credit rationing  will 
discourage  private  investment  which rften has  a  significant  non—traded 
goods component.  Public spending cuts  are  also  likely to  fall  to  a 
significant  extent  on non—traded  goods.  In a well—functioning  econmy  with 
a  flexible relative price  of  traded to  non—traded goods  and  resource 
mobility  between  the  traded  and  non—traded goods  sectors,  a  fiscal 
contraction  will reduce the relative  price  of non—traded  goods  and cause a 
movement of resources  into the  traded  goods  sector.  This eliminates  the 
incipient  excess  supply  of non—traded  goods  at  the old real exchange  rate. 
The  non—traded goods  market equilibrium  condition,  given in equation 
(10)  permits one  to  summarise  the  proximate  determinants of  the  real 
exchange  rate in a convenient  manner. 
P  P  G  QN—CN+IN+CN+I  (10) Given  the  economy—wide  resource  endovrnencs  and  ode  degree  of 
intersectoral  resource  mobility,  Q  is  a decreasing  function of the real 
exchange rate  and QT an increasing  function see eg. Dcrnbusch 
[1980]).  The concave production  possibility  frontier is  the curve A  in 
Figure  1. 
Given  aggregate  real  private  consumption,  private  consumption of 
non—traded  goods  is an increasing  function  of the  real exchange rate.  :n 
the Cobb—Douglas  (constant  expenditure  shares)  case  this yields: 
4 
— (l)p  (Ii) 
The share  of non—traded  consumption  in total consumption  is denoted 
A current tax  increase reduces  aggregate  consumption (barring  debt 
neutrality).  In Figure 1.  this  causes  a movement of production from  a 
point such as  f11 to  a point such as fl2)-  Absorption  would move from a 
point such  as  (with  a trade  balance  deficit  measured by  the  vertical 
distance  Z1 — fl1)  to  a point such as 2 (with  a trade  balance surplus 
measured by  the  vertical  distance 
—  fl1)  The  relative price  of 
non—traded  goods  (measured  by the  absolute  values of the  tangents  to  the 
production  possibility  frontier  (T1T1 and  T2T2)  and the indifference  curves 
(F11 and 22)) falls,  i.e. T rises.  The same qualitative  effects follow 
from a  cut  in public spending  on non—traded goods;  even if this  were 
tax—financed,  the marginal private spending  share on non—traded goods  is 
less  than  100 per cent. 
Restrictions  on factor  mobility,  but still  unrestricted  flexibility  of 
factor prices and ''ive goods  prices,  would result in a  production —L3— 
possibility  frontier  such as  A'3'  that  ies  everT4here  ns:de the 
mobility  frontier' AL except  at the initia  'status quo"  posi::on  f?. 
Rigid relative  prices  or the  emergence  of Keynesian  demand—constrained 
equilibria  would show up as  movements  inside  Ehe  production poss:biltt 
frontier in response to a contraction  of  aggregate  demand.  E.g.  in the 
small country case where traded  goods  output  is never  demand—constrained, 
one  could get  a production equilibrium  at  instead of at i2  after  a 
fiscal  contraction:  excess  capacity  and  unemployment  emerge  in  the 
non—traded  good sector.  where  the  country  has some market power  in the 
markets  for  its  tradeables,  demand—deficient  excess  capacity  and 
unemployment  can emerge  also in the  traded  goods  sector  fol.owing  a fiscal 
contraction, 
An  issue  requiring  both more empirical  and more analytical research 
concerns thosa characteristics  of  countries  that  render  them  more likely  to 
experience  "Keynesian"  or  demand—constrained  excess  capacity  and 
unemployment  when subjected  to policies  aithed  at reducing  absorption.  The 
existence  of  a  large  modern or  "foal" non—traded goods  sector with 
production  for the  market rather than for subsistence  or.  in  the  traded 
goods  sector,  a downward—sloping,  rather inelastic  world demand schedule 
for  exportables,  seem necessary for  the  emergence  of demand—constrained 
equilibria.  So is the existence  of nominal  inertia  or stickiness  of money 
wages or  output prices.  The  larger and  more developed Southern Cone 
countries,  and coumtries  such as Korea and  Taiwan therefore  seem more 
likely  to undergo episodes  of Keynesian  excess  capacity  when fiscal  and/or 
monetary policy are  tightened than  the  poorer and  smaller  developing 
countries  with less extensive  formal  sectors.  Even in the Latin American 
and  East  Asian  NfC's,  wage  and  price  flexibility  could  reduce  the 
likelihood  and severity  of demand—deficient  recessions.  Little  is known of the peculiarities  of wage  and price  determnat.on in developing  countries, 
and of the extent  to which  the industrial  country  parables based  on nominal 
or  real  wage rigidities  need cc be adapted to fit  the  institutions  and 
experiences  of about 100 very heterogeneous  developing  atd  new  industrial 
countries. 
Within  the  traded  goods  sector,  changes  in  the  composition  of 
production  and demand  are likely in response  to a fiscal contraction  (see 
e.g.  Buiter  t1988b]  for  a  recent  theoretical  analysis  using  an 
intertemporal  model).  Figure 2A shows  an initial  production  equilibrium 
for importables  and exportables  at  f?1 on the QQ locus.  Domestic  demand  for 
exportables  and  import—competing  good  is  at l'  with  a  trade  balance 
deficit  (measured  in  imports)  of B.  The  fiscal contraction moves 
resources  out of the non—traded  goods  sector  into the  traded  goods  sector. 
The production  possibility  frontier  for exportables  and importables  moves 
to Q'Q'  In the  small  country  case considered  in Figure  2A,  the terms  of 
trade  are  unchanged.  If the  resources  released  by the non—traded  goods 
sector don't  favour either the  exporting  or  import—competing  sector,  the 
new  production point will  be  one  like  fl2  in  Figure 2A:  both' export 
production  and import—competing  production  will increase. 
The  fiscal contraction  which started  off the whole  process will reduce 
the  demand for  imports  as well  as for  exportable goods  (barring  very 
different  income  effects on the  demand  for exportables  and imports).  The 
new domestic  demand  point is at  with a trade  balance surplus  (measured 
in imports)  of 2B. 
A  country facing  a  downward—sloping  export demand  schedule would 
experience  a worsening in its  terms  of trade as resources  moved into the 
cradeables  sector.  Compared  with the  constant terms  of  trade  case,  the 
increase in  the  production of tradeables would favour import—competing goods  rather  than  the  production of  exportables.  n  Figure  23  the 
production  point  would move from  to a point  such as 22 rather than 
which  would  have  been chosen  at constant  terms of trade.1  Domestic  demand 
(not shown in Figure  2B)  would  be moved towards  exportabea  and away from 
import—competing  goods, compared  to what would  happen  at constant  terms  of 
trade. 
3.  Breakdowns  in  the internal  and external  transfer  orocesses 
What can go wrong  in the external—internal  transfer  process?  First, it 
may  be  economically or  politically impossible  to  effect the  internal 
fiscal  transfer,  This  means  either  that  the  governments  fiscal 
instrumentarium  is insufficient  or that it is unwilling  or unable  to use  it 
i  the manner  and to the extent  required. 
On the public  expenditure  side,  there  is little  point in a government 
committing itself  to a  programme of spending cuts  if  any  attempt  to 
implement  such cuts leads  to the fall of the government  and its repacement 
by a government  unwilling  to  contemplate  serious  cuts.  E.g.  severe cuts in 
spending  on  the military  raise  the danger  of a military  coup.  Cuts'in food 
subsidies,  in public sector civilian pay  or employment or  in Treasury 
subsidies  to loss-making  state  enterprises,  can lead  to unrest,  especially 
among  the  urbanised,  unioriised  and  better educated sections  of  society 
capable of undermining  or toppling  governments.  Debtor  country  governments 
often play the  "political  constraints  on public  spending cuts'  card quite 
skillfully in their  negotiations  with multilateral  lending agencies,  and 
foreign private and official  creditors.  While  these  constraints  may be 
real,  they  are not independent  of the past,  present and anticipated  future 
actions  of  the  grvernments  in  question and  the  scope  for  strategic 
b€aviour  is  considerable. Raising current revenues  is  difficult  rost develooitg countries, 
given  their  narrow  tax base.  For decades,  widening  the tax—base  (through  a 
more  broadly—based income  tax;  through  more  effective  enforcement  of 
existing income tax  rules;  through  a  broadly—based  sales  tax:  through 
expenditure taxes  etc)  has  been  a  standard recommendation  from  anyone 
considering options  for  fiscal  reform  in  developing countries,  but 
relatively  little  has  happened  thus  far.  The  recommendation  is 
nevertheless  repeated  here. 
Figures  3,  4 and 5 and Table  1 show  how the overall  tax burden and its 
composition  differs  across developing  countries  and between developing  and 
industrial  countries.  The greater role  of direct  taxes  on labour income 
(including  social  security  taxes) in the industrial  countries  stands  out as 
does  the  quite  important  role  of  taxes  on  international  trade  in  the 
developing  countries  especially  the poorest  ones and the more  open ones. 
Capital  flight  is another  factor  contributing  to a narrow  revenue  base. 
While  capital  flight  occurs  partly  in  response  to  macroetonomic 
mismanagement (such  as  the  maintenance of an overvalued exchange rate) 
part of it is likely to be motivated  by a desire to evade taxe.  The 
industrial  countries  that are the recipients  of much of this flight  capital 
could strengthen the  fiscal position of  many  developing countries by 
reporting  foreign  investment  income  to  the  fiscal authorities  of  the 
developing  countries  or even  by acting  as their  agents in collecting  taxes 
that are due. 
Through  asset  sales,  including  privatisation  of  publicly—owned 
industries,  the government  can achieve  an apparent  once—off  improvement  of 
its  revenue.  If these  assets  yielded a positive net cash flow  to  the 
government,  the shd'rt—run improvement  of  its  financial  position will be 
reversed in the  longer  run.  The asset sale is a financing item and like public  sector  borrowing,  belongs  "below  the Line'  There  may of course  be 
excellent reasons  for  wishing  to privatise,  incuding  hoped—for positive 
incentive  effects  leading  to  efficiency and  roductivity  gains  in  the 
privatised  industries.  Revenue  considerations  should,  however,  not play a 
role except to the extent that  the  government  can sell the  assets  to the 
private  sector at a price  in  excess  of  the  present discounted  value of 
future net cash flows  under continued  public  oership 
Even if the internal  fiscal transfer  is effected,  the external  transfer 
may  not  materialise  because  there  is  full  financial  crowding—out  or 
'crowding—in) or because  resources  do not  flow into  the  right  direction 
and relative  prices  do not adjust. 
The financial  crowding—out  mechanism  is Likely  to be quite  different  in 
a financially  repressed,  credit—rationed  developing  country  from  what it is 
in  industria'  country where  interest  rates  and  financial  asset prices 
approximate  the  market—clearing  paradigm more  closely.  with  private 
spending  constrained  by the availability  of rationed  credit,  the effect  on 
the  current  account  of an  increase  in  taxes  would,  with  a  marginal 
propensity  to spend  of unity,  not be offset (even  in  part)  by a rduction 
in  private  ssving.  "Debt  neutrality",  the  independence  of  private 
consumption  and investment  of the  government's  mix of borrowing and  tax 
finartcing12  would  a—priori  seem  extremely  unlikely  in  credit—rationed 
developing countries.  The preliminary findings  of Haque  l9861  and of 
Haque  and Montie]. [l987 which do not reject the null—hypothesis  of debt 
neutrality for  a  number of  developing countries,  are  therefore  very 
surprising.  With debt neutrality,  government  deficit  reductions  brought 
about through tax increases  would lead to an equal  reduction  in private 
saving,  leaving  tTie  current  account  unchanged.  Permanent  cuts  in 
"exhaustive"  public spending  also  would merely  result in an equal  increase in  private  consumption  and no  effect  on  the  trade  ba.ance.  seems 
extremely  unlikely  that  developing  countries  or  indeed  industrial 
countries)  exhibit  debt neutrality,  but more robust  empirical  evidence on 
the nature  and degree  of  financial  crowding—out'  on the demand  side would 
be most  useful. 
Economists  of the structuraliat  school  for a long time heve emphasised 
the  possibility  of  "supply—side"  financial  crowding—cut  and  this 
possibility  has  also  been  recognised more  recently  in  "mainstream' 
macroeconomies  (see  e.g.  Blinder  [1987]).  The simplest version of this 
involves  an "Austrian"  production  model with lags  between the application 
of inputs  and the  emergence  of saleable  output,  Such lags  create a need 
for working capital  to  finance  the  process  of production;  the  cost and 
availability  of  this working  capital  can affect  (or even  constrain)  supply. 
Reductions in  public sector  borrowing permitted by  lower  public sector 
deficits brought about through  spending  cuts can  therefore  boost supply 
even in the  short  run.  The  effect of  this  supply—side  stimulus on  the 
current  account  will depend  on the extent  to which it induces  an increase 
in private  absorption.  (What's good  news for the economy  need not e  good 
news for the current  account). 
The  resource  reallocation  from the  non—traded  goods  sector into  the 
traded  goods  sector may not  take place  to the required  extent,  or at all. 
Where intersectoral  resource  immobility  reflects  real economic rigidities 
(skill  mismatch,  spatially  separated labour  markets etc)  without serious 
externalities  there  is  no  prima—facie  cause  for policy intervention on 
efficiency grounds.  Where  inefficient  laws,  rules  and  regulations  in 
labour  markets;  housing markets and credit  markets unnecessarily  restrict 
the mobility of labtur  and other resources,  the usual "first—best"  policy 
prescriptions  apply:  eliminate  the sources of the inefficiency. —19— 
The  implications  of  fiscal  adjustment for  factor p::ces  ar.d  the 
distribution of  primary'  incomes)  depends  both  on  the  degree  of 
intersectoral  factor mobility and  on  the  factor intensities  of production 
Lfl  the  d:fferent sectors.  Owners  of factors  'specific  to'  the contracting 
sectors  (typically the  non—traded  good  sector  in  the  case of a  fiscal 
contraction)  will suffer  a  loss  of  rents  to  these  fixed  factors.  Even 
where  and when factors  are mobile and priced  competitively,  the  owners  of 
factors  used relatively  intensively  in the  contracting  sectors  wiLL suffer 
a fall  in real income,  If  these  potential losers  are  well organised  or 
easily mobilised and  if  they  cannot  be  bought off  with an  acceptable 
compensation  scheme,  they  may  be able  to  block the  policy changes  and 
prevent  the necessary  adjustment. 
Even  if  compensation  of  losers  is  feasible,  it  is  likely  to  be 
distortionary and  the  efficiency  losses  involved  in  the  side—payments 
mcchanisms  should  be  taken  into  account  in  a  comprehensive coat—benefit 
analysis. 
Rent—seeking  behaviour  may  become  especially  intense  when  the 
status—quo  is threatened;  the  real resource  cost of DUPE activites  will 
have to be added  to the cost of  failing  to implement  the fiscal program,  if 
the activities  are successful. 
Often (but  not  always)  the  signal  that  both indicates  the  need for 
resource  movements  and motivates  them,  is a change  in relative  prices.  The 
adjustment  process  following  a fiscal  contraction  can be frustrated  by the 
failure  to achieve  a sufficiently  large  depreciation  of the  real exchange 
rate,  i.e.  a decline  in the relative  price of non—traded  goods.  This is 
not  too  surprising once one  realises  that a  depreciation of  the  real 
exchange  rate tendsto  be associated  with a reduction  in real  consumption 
wages  13 Rigid  real  wages  in  excess  of  market clearing  values  are  often 
maintained in the  formal sector through  a combination  of union pressure. 
public sector  emplo'nnent and pay rules  and a high degree  of index—linking 
of money wages  to the  cost  of  living.  Achieving a real depreciation  in 
such  a  setting  means  rather  more  than  implementing  a  nominal 
"maxidevaluation"  and  validating  this  through  appropriate  supporting 
fiscal  policies  (see  e.g.  an and  Lirondo  11987]  and  van  Wijnbergen 
1986]).  It  means  achieving  a change  in  the balance  of power  in the labour 
market  by weakening  organised  labour and  strengthening  employers,  private 
and public,  through  legislation  and  other measures.  Having altered the 
fundamental  determinants  of industrial  bargaining  (and lobbying)  power  (a 
prooess  likely to  involve  significant  political  and  social  conflict) ,  a 
nominal maxi—devaluation  may of course well be helpful in  achieving  any 
target  real  devaluation  at  least  cost.  For  a nominal devaluation  to be 
superior to  a  nominal wage and  price  reduction,  some  form of  nominal 
inertia  in wage  or price determination  thust  be  present.  or  the  asset 
revaluations associated with  nominal  maxi—devaluations  must  be  less 
disruptive (or  oontractionafl')  than those  associated  with reductIons in 
domestic nominal  costs  and  prices.  The  rigidities  stressed  in  most 
discussions  of developing  countries'  labour  markets  are, however,  real, not 
nominal  rigidities.  Nominal  inertia  (both in the level  and rate of change 
of money wages  and prices)  may however  result  from lags  in the  indexation 
process,  staggered,  overlapping  wage  contracts  and  slow  adjustment in 
inflationary  expectations.  Possible  short—run  contractionary  effects  of 
maxi—devaluations  have  been  stressed  by  many  experts  (see  e.g. 
Diaz—Alejandro  ]l965J  ,  Kruan  and Taylor ]1978j  ,  van Wijnbergen (1986] 
Edwards  (1986]).  EYen  as a facilitating  instrument  in a real exchange  rate — 
adjustment  that is warranted  by the fundamentals  nom:na  max:—devauatcons 
don't  appear  to be an automatic  policy  choLce. 
Note that "once—off"  taxi—devaluations  are quLte  distinct  from  choosing 
a higher tate  of crawl  in a crawling peg exchange race regime.  f  the 
governments fiscal  and financial  policy  choices  imply  a permanently  higher 
rate  of monetary growth and  (eventually)  a  permanently higher race  of 
inflation,  a higher rate of depreciation  of the  nominal exchange  rate  is 
implied,  eventually.  Different  rates  of  (anticipated)  inflation imply 
different  amounts  of  "seigniorage"  or  anticipated)  Lnflation  tax 
extraction.  The  fiscal  aspects  of  the  inflation tax are  considered in 
Section  6 below, 
Incomes policy,  i.e. direct  wage (ard  possibly  price)  controls  coo will 
not be helpful in achieving  a  lasting  real depreciation  unless  _t changes 
the underlying  balance  of power in the  labour  market.  It may,  of course, 
still  be helpful  in  facilitating  the  transition from a  high  rate  of 
inflation  (or even a hyper—inflation)  to a lower rate of inflatLon  a  Least 
cost  in terms  of output  and employment  foregone,  by breaking the vicious 
"after—you"  equilibrium  of oligopolistic  wage and price determinati'on and, 
perhaps,  by adding to the credibility  of the accompanying  fiscal—monetary— 
exchange rate policy package.  Both incomes  policy and nominal  exchange 
rate policy  can be used to "signal"  government  intentions  and to "break"  a 
non—cooperative  wage  and  price  setting  equilibrium by  acting  as  a 
co—ordinating  device  for oligopolistic  unions  and firms, 
Finally,  even if the  right  fiscal  correction  is undertaken,  and  the 
private financial  surplus  does  not  decline  one  for  one  with  the  public 
sector financial  deficit,  and  the  real  exchange rate  depreciates  and 
resources flow outof the  non—traded into  the  traded goods  sector,  the 
resulting improvement  in the  trade balance may have the  wrong composition as  regards  increases  in exports  versus  reductions  in  imports  ithout 
detailed information  on  the  productive  technologies,  economy—wide  factor 
supplies,  intersectoral  factor  mobility,  global and domeatio  demands!  it is 
impossible  to determine  whether  the resourres  flowing  into the traded  goods 
sectors  should  be  allocated  to  the  production  of  exportables  or  of 
import—competing  goods.  The  1987  WDR  suggested  that,  as  an  empirical 
matter,  many  developing  ctuntries had  contravened  their  true  international 
comparative  advantage  by favouring  import  competition  over export  promotion 
through  cver-;alued exchange rates,  tariffs,  non—tariff  barriers to  trade, 
selective  use  of subsidies  and credit rationing  etc.  Even  where this  is 
true,  the magnitude of the  corrective  policy  response  that  is  required  is 
b"  no  means  obvious,  roe  identification  and  pursuit  of  comparative 
advantage  in  a  highly  distorted  economy  is  very  difficult,  not  only 
politically,  hut also  as a narrowly  technical  or conceptual  issue. 
4.  ThLj2jvenA  nation 
In  this  Section the  solvency of  a  national economy  is  studied not 
because solvency  is necessarily  (or even frequently)  a binding costraint 
on  external  borrowing  strategies,  but  because  the  "fcnard—locking" 
accounting framework  involved in solvency assessments  can  be  used  to 
evaluate  the  internal consistency  of  any  set  of  plans  for  external 
borrowing,  debt  senice,  exports,  imports  and  other  current  external 
transactions. 
Time—consistent external debt  strategies,  i.e.  plans  for  external 
borrowing and  repayment which  are  at  each  instant  in  the  perceived 
self—interest  of the  sovereign  borrowers  and the  creditors (absent  "third 
party"  enforcement of  the  laws  of  contract  (including the  laws  of 
bankruptcy)),  may well lie strictly in the  interior of what would be the —23— 
feasible set  in the  presence of credible,  binding commitments  by debtors 
and creditors.  Even  such  (sociail  sub—optimal;  time—consistent  tlans 
must,  however,  be feasible  or internally  consistent,  This Section  and the 
next focus  almost  exclusively  on the narrow  issue  that current and  future 
plans  should "add  up'.  For  the  analysis  of the  positive and  normative 
issues  of sovereign borrowing,  ability  and  willingness  to  pay  see  e.g. 
Eaton and  Gersovitz  r1981  (a,b),  1983:,  Eaton,  Gersovitz and  Stiglitz 
l986 and Kletzer [l984. 
Consider  the current  account  identity  in equation  'lb).  et F* 
be the nation's  stock of net foreign  assets,  f*  EF*/PQ  the  stock  of net 
foreign assets  as a fraction  of GD?,  tb  TB/Q the trade balance  surplus  as 
a  fraction  of GD?  and a*  EA*/PQ foreign aid and other  current  transfers 
from  abroad as a proportion of  GD?.  Let n be the proportional  growth  rate 
of real  GD?,  the domestic  rate of  GD? inflation, *  the  world rate of GD? 
inflation,  the proportional  rate of depreciation  of the nominal  exchange 
rate,  y  the proportional  rate  of depreciation  of the  real exchange rate 
(defined  here as  the ratio  of the  foreign  GD? deflator tines  the nominal 
exchange rate  to  the  domestic  GDP  deflator)  and  r*  the  forei'gri  real 
interest rate.14  It follows  that 
7  E  + *  — 
and 
j*  — 
Using  these notational  conventions,  equation  (lb) can be rewritten  as: 
tb + a* +(r*+-y-n)f*  (12) Note that  a depreciating  real exrhange  rate  17 >  raIses the domeenir 
real  resource  cost  of  any  given  foreign  real  Interest  rate.  The 
1 asset—revaluscions—and—real—growth—oorrected'  current  acount  identity  in 
(12)  implies  the  intertemporal national  budget  constraint,  present  value 
national  budget  constraint  or national  solvency  constraint given  in  (13) 
PN(s;cb+a*;r*y—n) denotes  the preeent  discounted  value,  at time  5.  of the 
entire planned or expected  future stream of trade  balance  surpluses  plus 
net foreign current  transfers  (as fractions  of GDP)  tb + a*,  where the 
discount  rate is  the real—exchange'-ratedepreciation—oorrected  foreign  real 
interest rate (r++y) minus  the growth  rate  of real  GDP,  n. 
—f*(a) z PV(e;tb+a*;r*n)  (13) 
Equation (13) means that  the present  discounted  value  of future  trade 
balance surpluses plus net  inflows  of  foreign  aid and remittances  (as a 
proportion  of GDF)  is just  equal  to the nation's  current  net external  debt 
(as a proportion  of GDP) J5J6  The  sum of the  trade  balance aurtlus  and 
the  net current transfers  will be referred to henceforth as the  nation's 
primary surplus. 
The  nation's primary  surplus  is occasionally  called the nation's net 
resource  transfer.  In  principle  names  don't  matter,  although  poorly  ohoaen 
names can sometimes  confuse  the unwary.  The primary  surplus  is the excess 
of domestic  income over nationsl  absorption.  The current  account  surplus 
ia the excess of national  income  over  national  absorption. 
The primary  surplus measures the nation's net resource transfer  to the 
rest of the world when domestic income  is  taken as  the  "benchmark"  or 
"origin"  relative to which transfers  are  measured.  The  current  account 
surplus  measures tife  nation's net resource transfer to  the  rest of the 
world if national income is taken  as the benchmark or origin.  The  first —25— 
transfer  concept  emphasises the  location  of  cesources  and  the  income 
screams  they  yield within the  nation's boundaries.  The  second concept 
focuses  on the ownership  of cesources  snd the associated  income  screams  by 
national  residents,  irrespective  of the location  of the tesourtes 
An  emphasis  on  the  "territorial'  definition over  the  "ownership" 
definition  (or vice—versa)  is sometimes  adopted  by those  with strong  views 
on the  (il)legitimacy  or priority  of foreign  ownership  claims on national 
resources  (directly  or  through  the  tax  sysremY  It  is  (fortunately  not 
necessary for  what  follows  to  get  sidetracked  any  further  into  these 
semantic  discussions. 
Equation (13)  follows  from  the  asset—revaluations  and  real—growth— 
corrected current  account identity (12)  only  if  the  following  rather 
technical—sounding condition  holds:  The  present  discounted  value of the 
nation's  net  external  debt  in  the  very  distant  (strictly  speaking 
infinitely  far) future  is zeroj7  What this means is that,  ultimately,  the 
external debt/CD? ratio has  to  grow at  a  rate  less  than r* + y  — n  or, 
equivalently,  that ultimately,  the real external  debt  has to grow  at a rate 
less  than r* + y,  or again that, ultimately,  the foreign  currency  value  of 
the external  debt should  grow at a rate below  i*.  Ultimately,  therefore, 
the country  will  have to run primary  surpluses  in order  to serzice  (pay the 
interest  on) its debt,  Solvency  does not require  that  the debt  be repaid, 
only that  it  is not possible indefinitely  to  finance  the  interest bill 
through  further borrowing:  at some stage primary  surpluses  must  be achieved 
and any further borrowing  will not be sufficient  to pay the entire  existing 
interest  bill.  The nation  cannot  play a successful  Ponzi  game. 
A debtor  country  (with f*<O)  facing  a resl interest  rate on its debt in 
excess of  the  rear growth rate  need,  in principle,  never  achieve  any 
current account surpluses in order to pursue  a strategy consistent  with -26— 
solvenoy;8  it must be  capable  of  zenerst:ng,  at  sore  point,  primary 
surpluses,  A rising  debt—GDP  ratio  is  not by otself  evidence  of imminent 
or  ultinete  insolvency;  only  a  debt  tIP  ratio  scheduled  to  rise 
indefinitely at a rate in excess  of r*  +  —  n would spell eventual default 
ot repudiation. 
Given the existing  debt,  the primary surpluses projected  for  the future 
and  the  projected  future  interest  rates,  expressions such  as  (13),  or 
(13')  or  (13")  in footnote 16]  can be  used to assess  the consistency of the 
external  debt strategy.  If,  under  current  policy  projections,  equation 
(13)  is  violated  (specifically  if  the  left—hand  side  exceeds  the 
right—handside) this  doesn't  mean  that  default is inevitable,  only  that 
the  strategy  under consideration  won't work.  What will "give"  to achieve 
equality in (13) is what the debate  during the current debt crisis is all 
about,  The lenders would  like to see larger  trade balance  surpluses  by the 
borrowers (larger  tb vsluea  in equation (13)  and  indeed current  account 
surpluses  to reduce  the creditors'  exposure  in the  debtor  countries) .  rn 
borrowers  would  like to see some combination  of more aid (larger a*)  ,  lower 
interest rates  (lower  r*)  ,  better  terms  of  trade  (negative  y),  higher 
growth (larger n) or a write—down  or write—off  of  (part  of)  the  debt (a 
smaller value of  —f*). 
Capital flight introduces  an important  further  dimension  to equations 
(12) and (13).  Net foreign assets,  F* consist  of official  foreign  exchange 
reserves  R*  and,  in many developing  countries,  of a large  amount  of.privste 
foreign  claims  or assets  —0*P against which is set a large  amount  of public 
or publicly guaranteed  debt,  *G  The income from the  private overseas 
asset  holdings often either stays  abroad or,  if repatriated,  manages  to 
escape  the  domesti3 fiscal  authorities.  New  private  capital  outflows 
similarly  are often  beyond the control  of the domestic authorities.  Much of  the debt crisis  debate then effectivel'i  focuses  on  the  .eft—hand—side  of 
te  rearranged  balance  of payments  equation 
D*G  —  + A*}  +  i*(*G_R*) + j*D*P_D*?  (:4) 
The  lenders  are  concerned  with the  developing  country's  debts  (D*0), 
not with its unattachable  assets  Income  from these  assets  tends  to stay 
abroad (i*D*, which is negative  automatically  disappears'  into  .-D*P) 
Even the  building up of reserves by  the  monetary  authorities  is  often 
viewed  with suspicion,  as being 'at the expense of" debt servtce  or, worse 
in anticipation  of a post—repudiation  cash—in—advance  internat:ona trading 
regime  for the country, 
Other  critics have pointed  out causal  links between  D*0 and D*?, with 
new foreign lending to  the  public  sector of highly indebted cevetoping 
countries  disappearing  virtually  instantaneously  as private  capital  flight, 
and at times  returning  to the lending banks by return  of electronic  mail. 
in the limit,  capital  flight  and the associated  tax evasion mean that, 
effectively,  the nation's  private external  assets  cease  to be partS of  its 
true  economic  base and certainly  of its public  sector  revenue  base,  leaving 
only the  public external liabilities.  This  threatens  the  solvency of 
potentially  viable  nations.  That the problem is serious  can  be inferred 
from Table  2 which reproduces  some estimates  by Cusnby  and Levich [98fl  of 
the extent  of flight  capital  for a number  of countries. 
5.  The  solvency  of  the public  sector 
The discussion  of "national  solvency"  in the  previous section should 
not lead one to think  of any country,  developing  or industrial,  as being 
well  characterised  by  a  single representative,  national agent,  i.e.  a —28— 
behaviourally  consolidated  private—cuci—public sector viob fu ooromar.d  over 
a.i  national resources  As  the  external transfer  inmost  deelopin5 
countries  is mediated  through  the public  sector,  s  eParate  Co  ideratior,  of 
the  financial  accounts,  solvency  constraint speodinz  programme  and revenue 
basis of the public sector  is in  order.19 
Equation (5)  gives  the  budget identity of the  consolidated  public 
sector,  i.e.  general government  central bank and state  enterprises. 
a  +  ÷  —  T  J a  + * )*Gq*)  (15) 
is  the  nominal  stock  of high—powered  money or reserve  money.  i.e.  the 
monetary base.  It consists  of coin and currency held by the  public ar,d 
reserves held by the  conmercial  banking system  and bears  a zero nominal 
interest  rate.  Gross  public sector  capital  formation  I,  the public  sector 
capital stock  KG and  the  depreciation  rate  of the  public sector  capital 
stock S  are related  by 
— 5KG. 
F*G  R*  *G is  the  government's  net  stock of  foreign  assets.  The 
gorernments  gross  return  from the public sector  capital  stock,  J  can  be 
written as the  product of  the  capital  stock  KG  and  its  gross  rate of 
return  7, i.e. 
.1  KG. 
We  also define the following  ratios to  GDP: 
B  1G  EF*G  h  H/PQ;  kG KG/Q;  b  cG  iG 
;  f*G —fl— 
ED°  •  and?  — 
Tb. gonr.n bu4n Ld.ntiey  15)  can than ha rsvrLtt.n a: 
db - 3f*G - .1kG • c - (s*+e) 
+ (fl_n)  (bf*&.kG) 
+ (r—r*)b — yf*G + 
- (.lh+(n+r)hJ 
tat  0  danots  ths nat  non-moustary liabLlit  L.a  of th. gonrn.snt,  and  d 
thsir mel.. to GOP, S.. 
B  EP*  U - p -r—- 
and 
Tb. budpe Ldsntity oan than ha wmiet.n moms compactly a Sn '16) 
(16) 
"Sr. 
• • (r(r*.isy))b + (fl4-r(rm6  (ha) 
0 • âh +  (n.rflt  (17b) —30— 
The  increase in  the  public sectors  net  debt—GD?  ratio  can,  from 
equation (16),  be expressed  as the  sum  of four  components.  The  first  is 
cG_(a*+o)  the  basit public sector orimary  (non—interest  current  or 
consumption sctount)  defitit  as  a  proportion of  GD?.  The  seoond. 
(r*y—n)d,  is  the  real  interest  paents on  the  debt corrected for  the 
growth  of real  GD?,  as a proportion  of  GD?.  The real interest  rate imputed 
to  the  debt  is  the  world  real  interest rate  r*  i*  —  plus  the 
proportional  rate of depreciation  of the real exchange  rate y.  The third. 
6  consists  of  the  additional  interest  losses  (which may  of  course be 
negative)  accruing on the  various  assets  and liabilities  due to  the  fact 
that the real rate of return on these  assets and liabilities  differs  from 
the world  real interest  rate corrected  for real  exchange  rate changes.  If 
domestic debt pays a real  interest rate in terms  of home goods (r)  in 
excess of  the  world real interest rate  corrected for  real exchange rate 
depreciation (r*')  then Q  increases  by an  amount  (r_(r*4iflb.  If  the 
foreign real  interest  rate  corrected  for 'real  exchange  rate  depreciation 
exceeds  the  net  real  rate  of  return  on  publir  sector  capital,  p 
—  5, 
6  increasea  by an  smount  (r*+—(p—&flkQ  Finally,  the  increase  in  the 
debt—GD?  ratio will be smaller,  the larger  c, real  seignior&ge  or the  real 
value  of  the  increase  in  the  nominal  high—powered money  stock  (as  a 
proportion  of  GD?). 
From (16) and (17a, l7b) a few obvious  facts  stand  out. 
Substituting  domest.ic  debt for foreizn....4..t. 
The substitution  of domestic  debt,  b,  for  foreign  debt (_f*G),  will 
worsen  the  budgetary position of  the  government if  the  domestic real 
interest rate exceeds  the  foreign real interest rate corrected for  real 
exchange rate depreciation.  Both Turkey  and Brazil  have in recent  years pursued  such a strategy,  which may not have been very sesibe  see nand 
and van ijnbergen l987). 
If the substitution  of domestic  government  debt far iorelgn pubc debt 
takes  the form of a "stock—shift"  open—marKet  swap,  the nat:on's  total  net 
foreign  indebtedness  at  that  instant  wilL  not  of  course  have  been 
affected.  Private  external indebtedness  must have increased  by  the  same 
amount as the reduction  in foreign  indebtedness.  The governments balance 
sheet  will have been weakened  while that  of the private  sector  has  become 
stronger.  This creates  a problem  if and to the extent that the government 
has  trouble  effecting the  increased  internal  fiscal  transfer  required to 
service  its costlier  debt. 
If the substitution  of more expensive  domestic  public  debt for foreign 
public  debt takes  the  form  of the  government  financing  a larger  share  of 
its flow  deficit  by borrowing  domestically,  there  will be,  as time passes. 
first—order effects  on  the  evolution  of  the  nations  net  external 
indebtedness,  (1)  through  the  higher futuire  public  sector  deficits  that 
would result because r > r*  y  (even if seigniorage,  the primary deficit 
and the rest  of 2 are unchanged);  and (2>  through  any effects  of the change 
in the  internal—external  financing  mix on private  saving and  investment. 
If  the  private  sector cannot borrow  abroad  (or  cannot  increase  its 
borrowing abroad),  the  increased  government borrowing in  the  domestic 
capital markets  will crowd out  private  investment,  either  by pushing up 
domestic  real interest  rates  or by tighter  credit  rationing.  The  response 
of private  saving  is less  clear—cut,  but under the conditions  just stated, 
the  private  sector financial  surplus  will have to  increase  by the  full 
amount of  the  switch of government  borrowing from the  external  to  the 
internal  financial  markets.  When  private  access to  the  international 
financial  markets is  limited  but non—zero,  the  short—run  response of the current  account  is still  likely  to be  an improvement,  a.touh it  again  is 
likely  to have been purchased  at a cost in terms  of domestic investment. 
Over time,  the  government would  also encounter the  more acute  internal 
fiscal  transfer problems  discussed  before. 
The debt  burden  and the real  exchange  rate. 
As was discussed  in connection  with national  solvency in Section  4.  a 
depreciating real  exchange  rate  (y > 0)  increases  the  real  domestic 
resource  cost of se7icing  foreign  debt  (at any given world real interest 
rate r*)  .  This confronts  debtor  countries  with the unpleasant  dilemma  that 
they must achieve an improved  level  of  competitiveness  in order to generate 
the trade  surpluses  to required  seice their  debt,  while  the very process 
of improving  their competitiveness  increases  the real burden  of that debt, 
gumnontheubiicseor  capital stock. 
The  implications  of  different  rates  of return on  the  public sector 
capital  stock2°  can be brought  out most easily  by considering  two extremes. 
The first,  optimistic,  scenario  has the ned rate of return,  — 5,  equal  to 
the  opportunity cost of government  borrowing,  r* + ,  if  in  addition 
r — r* — ', the  primary  deficit  driving  the debt dynamics in this  case  is 
simply  the current or consumption  account deficit,  c  — (a*+) 
The second, pessimistic  (or realistic?) ,  scenario  has the gross rate of 
return  equal  to zero.  Capital  effectively  ceases to  be an  asset  and 
gross  investment  (iG  dkG÷(&+n)kG)  is like  public  consumption  expenditure. 
Let  net  public  debt  excluding capital  as  a  proportion  of  GDP  be 
a  (B_EFG*)/PQ.  If in addition  we have r — r* + y,  the budget identity 
becomes 
cG + iG  — a*+r) + (r*+y—n)a —  (18) The primary  deficit  driving  the debt dynamics  now :ncludes  grcss  puolic 
sector  capital  formation.  'ith  t c  9  the  true  primary  :eficit, 
ct —(s*÷r,  ÷ P  would  be e'en  Larger. 
The solvency  constraint  of the rublic  sector 
From equation (l6  we can  obtain tne  rnterterporal  budget ror.strarnt 
preaent  value  budget  constraint  or solvency  constraint  of the public  sector 
in  the same way as was done for the nation  as a whole rn Section .  It is 
given  in equation  l9) 
d(s)  PVs;-+s*_2_cC,r*y_n)  p75,7 r1—n 
The  present discounted  value  of future primary government  surpluses 
(including  2,  the drain on public sector  revenues  caused  by costly  domestic 
debt and  low—yielding  public sector  cspitsl'  plus the  present  value  of 
future  resources appropriated  by  printing  money should  be  equal  to  the 
outstanding  net public  debt.21 
As in Section  1,  the  solvency  constrstnt  ,19j  should  be viewed as sr. 
ex—ante  consistency  check  on the governments spending,  revenue  raising  and 
monetisation  plans, given  its initial outstanding  debt, 
When spending and revenue  projections  are  made and evaluated,  it  is 
important  to be aware of the  spending  and  revenue  implications  of various 
structural  adjustment  policies. 
Trade  liberalisation,  when it  takes  the  form of reducing tariffs  or 
export taxes  and  when  the  revenue  base is  less  than unit elastic  with 
respect  to tax and tariff rates, will reduce  revenues  and weaken  solvency 
unless future  primary deficits are  reduced  or future seigniorage  revenues 
are boosted.  'If neither  occurs,  the debt will not be serviced  in full and 
we'll see, either eicplioit  (partial)  repudiation or capital levies  etc. 
This is not necessarily a bad  thing,  although it  is  likely to affect adversely the government's  future  abili::  to  borrow.  The  case  for  a  more 
explicitly  contingent public  debc  (internal ar.d  excerna1  has  been  made 
forcefully among  others  by  R.  Dornbusch  :1985  pplfl1SC and  pp  IT5—IlS' 
Provided  the contingencies  are clearly  defined  and obserzable  and no: under 
the control  of the borrowing  government,  the case for making debt  holders 
share  (with  labour and the owners  of capital)  in  the burden  of adjusting  cc 
internal  and external  exogencus  shocks  would  seem to be a strong  one. 
Replacing  quotas and import  licenses  (which  typically  are not auctioned 
off competitively)  by uniform  tariffs,  as is currently  being recommended  by 
the  World  Bank,  will  raise  government  revenue  in  addition  to  having 
allocative  or  efficiency  effects  and  may  reduce  th  returns  to 
rent—seeking  activity. 
The consequences  of internal  and external  financial  liberalisacion  for 
the  government's  ability to  extract  seigniorage  will be  considered in 
Section  6. 
6. 
Seigniorage,  c,  the  increase  in the  nominal  high—powered  mon' stock 
(as  a proportion  of GDP)  can  be written in a number  of ways as  shown  in 
equation (20).  ji  B/H  is the proportional  rate of growth  of the nominal 
high—powered  money  stock  and  V  PQ/H  is the income  velocity  of cirrulation 
of high—powered  money. 
(20) 
— ab +  (n+T)h As can be seen from the second  line  of  2O  total  segniocage  can be 
broken do  into  2  components.  the  reduct:on  in the  high—powered  none  — 
CD?  ratio  that  would  occur  as  a  result of nominal  GD?  growth,  hoding 
constant  the nominal  stock  of high—powered  money  n-)h  and the change  in 
the  high—powered  money—GD? ratio  h -S[  :f  money  demand eouas 
money supply,  (ns)h can be  interpreted  as  the  growth in nominal money 
demand  due to inflation  and real GD? growth  at a given ve.ocity.  h  is the 
increase  in  real  money  demand  doe  to  declining  velocity.  The  two 
components  will often  cove  in opposite  directions  Higher  actual  inflation 
will cet.pa.r  ncrease  'n,h.  Directly and via hgher nomina  :nterest 
rates,  higher  expected  inflation  will  also  tend  to  increase  velocity 
(reduce money demand  at any given  level  of  income,  The third  line of 2D 
provides a decomposition  of  seigniorage  or the  inflation  tax  into  an 
inflation  tax rate,  &/H  and an inflation  tax base,  h  V-.  A hogher 
inflatton  tax rate  will,  given  the tax  base,  raise  seigniorage  revenue.  To 
the  extent that a higher  value of  raiaeà  the expected  rate of Lnflatlon 
(and  for  increases  in s that are  perceived as permanent,  it wi. do  so 
sooner or  later),  it will also  raise  velocity and  reduce the  tax  base. 
Only if the  elasticity  of velocity  with respect  to  is less  than unity, 
will seigniorage  revenue go up as  increases 
Consider  the monetary  base demand  function  given  in equation  (21) 
h — f(i,Q;)  fj a 0  (21) 
'p  is a  set  of  variables  such as  expected inflation,  expected nominal 
exchange rate depreciation,  foreign interest rates,  official  bank reserve 
requirements,  capital  controls  etc.  that may influence  the  demand  for base 
money in addition  t  i and Q. fQ will be positive  negative  ii t  eastiotv  of  real  money base 
demand  with respect  to real income  is greater  than  1less  tharJ unity  For 
the moment,  assume a unitary income  elasticity  and a  real  interest rate 
that is independent  of  the rate of infThtion.  In the  Long run,  — n. 
For a number  of commonly used money  demand  functions  such  as the linear  one 
in (22a) and the log—linear  one  in (22b)  the  long—run  relationship  between 
monetary  growth and real seigniorage  has  the  "Laffer curve"  shape shown in 
Figure 6.22 
h — a — bi  a,b, > ü;  i < ab  (22a) 
In h  a  — b'  i  b  > 0 
For  the  linear  demand  function,  shown  in Figures  6A,  it,  and for  the 
log—linear  demand function,  shown in Figures  6C,  iD  there  is  a  unique, 
finite,  long—run seigniorage  maximising rate  of  inflation  (a/2b  in  the 
linear case,  i/b'  in  the  log—linear case).  No rational policy—making 
process  would drive  the  long—run inflation  rate beyond this  point  as  in 
addition to the  costs  of higher inflation,  there  would be a reduction in 
inflation  tax  revenues.  Many  past  and  recent hyper—inflationary or 
near—hyper—inflationary  episodes  nevertheless saw  the  rate  of  inflation 
pushed well  beyond  the  point  of  negative  aeigniorage  returns.  The 
political  economy  of  such  monetary  irrationality  is  not  very  well 
understood. 
The importance  of seigniorage  as a source  of government  revenue varies 
widely across  countries  at  a point in  time  and over time  for  any  given 
country.  Only-  the  cross—sectional  variation is  shown  in Table  3.  Note 
that  all these data understate  seigniorage  revenue,  as they only refer to 
currency outside  banks.  Currency  held by  the banks as  "till  money"  and reserves  held either  as cash or in the  form  of  bankers  baances  with the 
Central  Sank  are omitted  because  the data tend to be very rnreliabe. 
The  seigniorage  tax  base  can  be  affected  powerfufly by  direct 
internatiOnaL  currency  subst:tution  ooLLarisat:on"  and  by  comeatic 
financial  developments  and refrms  lomestic  finantial  deregulation  and 
the  development  of deposit—taking  instittiona paying attractive  interest 
rates  will shrink  the demand for currency  held outside  the  banking system 
(Cur)  .  With  a  given  reserve  requirement  S  against  depcs  its  'tep, 
(assumed  binding),  the  reserve  component  of the  monetary baae  Res'  will 
grow when  bank deposits  grow,  as 
Rca  SLep 
Since  H  fir ÷ Res,  even the sign of the net effect  of domestic  financial 
deregulation  and the growth of bank deposits  on the seigniorage  tax oase is 
an empirical  matter  Flight out of domestic  currency  and out of domestic 
bank  deposits  into  foreign currency and/or  foreign bank  deposits  it. 
response to  international  interest  differentials  and/or expectations  of 
exchange rate depreciation  will unambiguously  shrink the  aeignior'age tax 
base.  More quantitative  information  on  the demand for high—powered  money 
as a function  of expected inflation,  domestic  and foreign interest rates, 
expected  exchange  rate  depreciation,  the  development  and  degree  of 
sophistication  of the banking system  and the tightness  and effectiveness  of 
exchange  controls would  be very  helpful. 
In  an  economy  in  which  all  sources  of  government revenue  are 
distortionary,  optimal  polity will  minimise the  unavoidable dead—weight 
losses  involved in raising  a given  total  revenue  by using all available 
revenue instrumentC  including  the inflation  tax.  More reliable  knowledge —38— 
concerning  the effect cf  changes  in the inflation  tax rate on the inflation 
tax yield is required  if  this  instrument  is to be used properly. 
Seigniorage  as  defined  here can be viewed as  the  expected inflation 
tax.  If he government  has  a significant  amount  of  long—dated  nominally 
denominated  (non—index—linked)  debt outstanding,  it  can  in addition use 
unanticipated inflation  as  a capital  le'rj  on the  holders  of  this  debt. 
Since the external  debt is denominated  in foreign  currency  and much of the 
domestic  debt is effectively  index—linked,  this  may not be as  important  a 
source  of revenue  as it could  be in many of the industrial  countries,  In 
addition,  this policy suffers  from the defect that repeated  use  will lead 
to inflation risk  premiums  being  built  into  the  nominal  yields  on  newly 
issued nominal debt. 
Finally,  inflation  will  affect  the  real  yield  of  other  taxes  and 
revenue sources  (specific  duties,  charges,  tariffs etc.)  and the real value 
of public  spending  because many spending  programmes,  tax schedules  etc.  are 
not index—linked  and adjust  to inflation  only  with a lag. 
The  biases do not  always  go  in the  same direction.  Inflation  will 
raise the real yield of a progresive  income  tax when the progressive  rate 
schedule is  not  index—linked  and adjusted to inflation  only with a  lag. 
Delays in the collection  of taxes  can,  unless the  right  interest  penalty 
for  arrearages is  imposed,  reduce  the  real tax  take significantly  in an 
inflaticnary  environment.  Again our  quantitative  knowledge of the  effect 
of  inflation  on real public spending and  revenues  is very  incomplete, 
although Tanzits [19781  work suggests  that very high rates  of  inflation 
unambiguously  and significantly  reduce  real  public  sector  revenues. 
What  is  clear  is  that  the  pursuit  of  reductions  in  the  rate  of 
inflation  in the  fange  where this reduces  seigniotage  may have  serious 
fiscal  consequences.  If no matching reduction  in the  primary  government —39— 
deficit  is achieved,  the  growth  of in:erest—bear:ng  puc:c debt  internaL 
or  external)  will be increased.  f taxes  are  raised  or  spending  cut  to 
prevent an  increase  in  the growtn of  the public  debt,  the demand—depressing 
effect of the  monetary tightening  wilL be  augmented  by  a  contracttonary 
fiscal  impulse  and  a  serious  recession  may  result,  hiLe  this  may be 
judged to  be  a price  worth paying for a reduction  in the  mnflatcon  rate, 
the  choice  should be  made  in full awareness  of  the entire  range  of likely 
consequences. 
7.  The  consistency  of inflation  tarZets atd  financeable  deficits 
Recently the  world  Bank has  developed a  'short—hand consistency check 
on  certain  aspects  of  a  governments  fiscal  financial  and  monetary 
strategy.  This approach,  based on  the work of Anand and van Wijnbergen 
[l987, Knight [1986  and Coutinho l986, 1988; within  the Bank and closely 
related to some recent  work of mine (Buiter  [l983a,b[  l985j,  :l987a,b[) 
can be  interpreted  readily  using the  accounting  framework of  Sections  6 
and 7. 
Let  z  denote  the  real—growth—corrected  operational  deficit  as  a 
proportion  of  GD?,  i.e.  the  su of  the  primary  deficit  and  the 
asset—revaluations—and—real—  growth—corrected  interest paid on the debt,  as 
a proportion  of  GD?: 
z  cG +  —  (a*+r)  + Q  + (r*+y_n)(b+d*G_p*)  (23) 
The public sector  budget identity  given e.g.  in equation (18)  can be 
rewritten  as 
0'  z — (1b+M*G.lp*)  (24) This  identity can  be  used in  a  number of  ways.  One  is  to  treat 
mnetary  financing,  o.,  as the residual. 
To  implement  this,  proiections  are  provided  for  z,  i.e.  for  the 
primary deficit  and  the  interest  payments on  the  outstanding  stocks of 
internal  and  external  public  debt.  This  requires  projections  of  real 
interest  rates,  i.e.  of  domestic  and foreign  nominal  interest rates,  of 
domestic and  foreign  inflation  rates  and  of  changes  in  the  real  (or 
nominal)  exchange  rate.  The  "financeable  deficit" is  then calculated. 
basically  the desired  (or permitted)  changes  in domestic indebtedness,  Oh, 
external  indebtedness,  dd*G,  minus  any desired  increase  in  external  foreign 
exchange  reserves,  This uniquely  determines  a-,  the value of the  real 
resources  (as  a  percentage  of  GDP)  that  the  government will  have  to 
appropriate by running  the printing  presses. 
With  the required  amount  of  seigniorage  from equation  (24),  plus  a set 
of equations  relating  base money  to inflation,  (typically  centred around  a 
high—powered money  demand function)  the  inflation  rate  implied by  the 
fiscal—financial  programme  on the right—hand—side  of equation (24)  can be 
determined.  A  popular candidate  used  in  World  Bank  analyses  is  the 
long—linear base  money  demand  function  (in the example  considered  here,  the 
income  elasticity  of money demand is  constrained  to  equal  unity)  The 
inflation  rate is the only  other argument  in this function.  it  in equation 
(25) denotes  the desired or long—run  demand for base  money as a fraction  of 
GDP. 
h —  3'>O  (25) 
The  actual inflation  rate  is assumed  to exceed (fall  short  of)  the 
expected,  inertial  or 'core'  inflation  rate  whenever  h exceeds .  This relationshcp  can be perturbed  by additive  exogenous  shocks  :c, 
r — e(h—h)  +  +  '26) 
Finacly,  cnertcal  inflatcon  :s associec to be  a  sccple  fcnct:on  of 
past inflation,  say, 
— \—l  O<xcl  2) 
Given  o'  from equation  ,,24)  and eqcations  25  26  and  fi  we can 
calculate  the  inflation  ate  consistent  with toe  deficit  soensrco  and  the 
assumptions  about  the financeable  deficit.  This  :mp,ied or consistent  rate 
of inflation  can then  be compared  with the  target rate  of inflation  and 
with the inflation  assumptions  that are implioct  in the projections  made to 
obtain  the right—hand—side  of equation  p24). 
The converse  approach  is to start  with a target  path for  inflation  and 
to derive  the path it implies for seigniorage  c given  equations  25  '26 
and (27).  Given the amounts  chat can be  'borrowed at home and abroad  and 
given the target  change  in  international  reserves,  this implies  a path for 
the  operational  deficit,  This  can then  be compared with the  scnIal  plan 
for the operational  deficit. 
Any  inconsistencies  (in practice most likely to take the  form of an 
implied  inflation  rate in excess  of the target  rate or an implied  deficit 
in excess  of the target  one) will have to be reconciled  by some combination 
of  revisions  in  inflation projections,  cuts  in  the  primary  deficit, 
reductions  in the internal  or external  interest  burden,  increased  internal 
or excernal borrowing (including arresrsges)  or  lower  foreign  exchange 
reserves. 
Note that from he  public  sector  solvency  constraint  given in equation 
(29),  given  the  initial net  debt  and  the  projected path  of  future (corrected)  primary  deficits  and of future real interest  rates  and grcwth 
rates,  the present  discounted  value  of future  seigniorage  required  to make 
these  projections  consistent  with governent  soluency can be calculated. 
This  PDV  can of course  be achieved  with many different  time paths  for  o-. 
The approach  outlined  in this  section picks  among these  many feasible  time 
paths  for  by  specifying paths  for  b  + d5  (ie  for  the 
financeable  deficit) 
I  consider this  approach (basically  a  simple  "uses  and  sources  of 
funds"  accounting  exercise  for  the consolidated  public sector  with minimal 
behavioural  fill—in  (just  the base  money demand  function  and the  inflation 
equations)),  to be potentially useful  because  it  imposes the  essential 
discipline  of looking  at the  totality  of plans  for public sector  outlays, 
receipts  and financing.  Such an integrated  approach is the  only one  that 
makes  sence.  Granted this 'global'  approval of  the  method,  I have some 
worries  about  misleading  inferences  that  might  be  drawn  from  its 
pr.ima—faci.e  low  behavioural  content.  There also are,  inevitably,  serious 
problems  with any actual  empirical  implementation. 
Nothing  from  nothing 
The  approach carries  with  it  the  danger  that  a  casual reader or 
careless  user might  infer  that in order  to engage in macroeconomic  policy 
evaluation  all one needs  is a base money  demand function  and an inflation 
equation.  (If prices  were  perfectly  flexible,  one could even  dispense  with 
the separate  inflation  equation).  In  fact,  in  order  to do the exercise,  a 
vast amount  of (implicit)  economic  and econometric  modelling  is required  to 
produce projections  for the right—hand—side  of equation (24).  There  we 
find a number of key  endogenous  variables  whose determination requires 
(implicitly  or explcitly) the kind  of general  equilibrium  macroeconometric 
modelling  that  the consistency  check  appears to short—cut. Among  these  key  endogenous  variables  are  the  domestic real  nteresc 
rate,  the  real  exchange  rate  through -  and  the  growth  rate  anc  Level  of 
real  economic activity.  The  latter  enter  through  n and  because  real  tax 
receipts  and  other current  revenues  and  outlays  are  fnctions  of  among 
ocher  things  the levels  of output  and employnent  The  consistency  check 
should  in principle  be  extended  to  include these variaoles,  Vhen  this 
not  done,  the  danger extsts  that  changes  in policy that  are  intended to 
eliminate  an ex—ante  inconsistency  Detween  inflation  nlans  and  budget 
deficit  plans  will only do so by enlarging  tne  inconsistency  between  the 
inflation  and deficit  projections  on  the  one  hand and  the  real  interest 
rate,  real  exchange rate  and real economic  activity  assumptions  on  the 
other  hand. 
The base  money aemsnd function 
Having  estimated  base  money  demand  functions  for the JK and USA for the 
post—World—war—Il  period,  it is  easy  to become impressed  and depressed) 
with the  instability  of this  relationship:  Much of this  can no doubt be 
explained  (ex—post)  as reflecting  irregular  spurts of financial  inncvation 
ard  development.  In  addition  there  are  likely  to  be  episdea  of 
(ctis)intermediation  in  response  to changes  in regulatory  policy.  In a new 
industrial  count'  such as e.g.  Brazil all these sources  of instability  are 
likely  to be present  in force, plus some others.  Variations  in  the degree 
of stringency  of capital  controls  are  likely  to be reflected  in variations 
in the degree  of (direct)  international  currency  substitution.  Changes  in 
reserve  requirements  are  also likely  to shift a simple  base money  demand 
function  such as the one given  in equation  (25). 
The  inflation  function 
Equations  (26)  and  (27)  define  a  completely  backward—looking' 
inflation and  price process.  There  is  no  room  for  announcement  effects, credibility  etc.  to  affect  the  rate  of  inflation  other  than  through  the 
shift dumy x.  There is also  no  room in  the  equation (again except  through 
x)  for a role for  indexarion  arrangements.  direct or  indirect effscts  of 
exchange rare behaviour  or cost  pressures  (domestic  or irtorted  -  Nhi.s  it 
is  easy to criticise any piece  of empirical  work for errors of omission 
(and  errors of commission) ,  these  specific criticisms  are born not out of a 
scholarly  thirst for  purity,  but out  of worries resulting from the  fact 
that  these  particular omitted  factors  are  widely recognised as  having 
played (and continuing to play)  a major  role  in  the  economic processes 
governing  contemporary  Brazil,  Argentina,  Mexico,  etc. 
The seisniorage  Laffer  curve 
As was pointed out  in Section  6,  many theoretirally  and empiriosflv 
acceptable  money demand  function  have the property that  there  is more  than 
one rate of  inflation  that can generate  any  given amount of seigniorsge. 
This is most easily  seen if we consider  stationary  equilibria  in whioh the 
(actual  and expected)  rate of inflation  Th constant over time.  (Not  all 
plausible  money demand functions  have this  property;  e.g.  the  hyperbolio 
function  h — a"/(b"+r) with a",b">O has seigniorage  independent  of he tate 
of  inflation;  the  constant velocity version h — a,  anO  has  seigniorage 
increasing  with inflation  forever;  other reasonable  functions  yield many 
local  seighiorage  peaks  and troughs) 
The  long—linear  function often used in  the  Bank's  analyses  has  the 
unimodal  long—run  seigniorsge  Laffer  curve depicted  in Figure  (Ec,d),  When 
the inflation  rate is calculated  that  yields  a given  amount  of seigniorage, 
the  lower of the two  rates  is typically  chosen in Bank analyses.  While 
this may be god  prescriptive  economics  (no rational  policy—making  process 
would drive  the  rate of  inflation  beyond the  point at which  it  yields 
maximal  revenue),  it  is  likely to be bad  positive economics,  Every S 
hyperinflation in history clearly  put the  country cYrercencing  it on  the 
revenue—inefficient  side of  the  seigniorage  Laffer curve.  Toe  same  L5 
likely  to have been true with the  very high rate of inflation  seen cn a 
number  of Southern  Cone  countries  in recent  years. 
inflation  and the primary  deficit 
It is  likely  to be empirically  important  to allow for  the effect of 
inflation  on the primary deficit  As  pointed out in Section  6,  we know 
from the  wore of Tanzi l8( and  others  that with very high rates  of 
inflation,  government  real  tax  revenues  will  decline,  quite  often 
dramatically.  If there are  any  elements  of nominal  progression  in  the 
income  tax  structure,  this real revenue—raising  effect  wcii be swamped  by 
the  effect of collection lags  and  lags  in  the  inflation  adjustment  of 
specific  duties  etc.  Less is known  about  the effect  of high (and variable) 
rates  of  inflation  on  government  expenditures.  Empirical  studies  'rust 
allow  for  feedback from  the  inflation  rate  to be  first  term  on  the 
right—hand—side  of equation (24). 
More lack  of suoerneutraiiCY 
Different  rates  of inflation may affect  the right—hand—side  of equatton 
(24)  not  only  through  the  primary  deficit but  also  through  the  real 
interest  rate and the depreciation  of  the real  exchange  rate.  I  don t know 
how  to  evaluate  the quantitative  significance  of this point. 
Unclever  budget  cuts 
It may be unnecessary  to point  out that  even  within the primary  deficit 
total,  the various spending  and revenue components  are not independent  of 
each other,  in the short run and in the  long run,  Spending cuts that 
depress activity also depress output_or—income—sensitive  receipts.  Even 
without extreme Iifferian responses,  supply—side—friendly  tax  cuts  or 
subsidies  may  recoup part  of  the  initial  budgetary cost.  Cuts  in productive  public  sector capital  foation  may damage the  suopy side of 
the economy,  conceivably  to the point  that  the public  deficit  rises  rather 
than falls  (see Buiter 11987b).  Phile these  problems  are not  specific  to 
the  approach  under consideration,  they  are  important  when  the  policy 
response  to an 'inconsistency  verdict"  is being pondered. 
8.  Conclusion 
This paper  is a non—systematic  perusal  of some of the key issues  in the 
design and  conduct of  fiscal  policy for  stabilisation and  structural 
adjustment  in developing  countries.  Its coverage  undoubtedly  is subject  to 
both Type  I  and Type II errors.  I nevertheless  hope that its focus  on the 
external and  internal transfer  problems.  national solvency and  public 
sector  solvency  (with a fairly  extended  discussion  of the inflation  tax and 
the  consistency  of fiscal,  financial  and  monetary plans)  does provide a 
useful  starting  point  for further discussion. Footnotes 
*  Many  of the participants  at a Worlo Sana  V 0 R.  workshop on fiscal 
policy  in the 0.E.C.O.  and in the develoring  countries  on October  30, 
1987 made helpful  comments on an  earlier draft  of this paper  wh:ch  was 
written  as  a background  paper  for  the  183 W.D.R.  Among  them  were 
Cuillermo  Calvo, Vito Tanzi, Sweder  van V:'nbergen,  Alain Ire and Brian 
Pinto.  Ous  Ranis  also made a  number  of  helpful  suggestions  on an 
eatlier  draft,  The World Bank doea  not accept responsibility  for  the 
views  expressed  herein  which are thoae of  the  author  and should  not be 
attributed  to the World Bank or to ita  affiliated  organizations.  The 
findings,  interpretations,  and conclusions  are the  results  of research 
supported by  the  Bank,  they do not  necessarily  represent  official 
policy of  the  Bank,  The  designations  employed,  the  presentation of 
material,  and  any  maps  used  in  this  document  are  solely for  the 
convenience  of  the  reader and  do  not  Imply  the  expression of  any 
opinion whatsoever  on  the  part of  the  World Bank or  its  affiliates 
concerning  the legal  status  of any courtry,  territory,  city,  area,  or 
of its authorities,  or concerning  the  delimitation  of its bourdaries, 
or national  affiliation. 
These  are Argentina,  Bolivia,  Brazil,  Chile,  Columbia.  Cote  Divoire, 
Ecuador,  Mexico,  Morocco,  Nigeria,  Peru,  Philippines,  Uruguay, 
Venezuela  and  Yugoslavia.  The  World  Bank's  group  of  seventeen 
"Heavily—indebted  countries"  adds  Costa Rica  and Jamaica.  Further 
major  debtors  are South  Korea, Thailand  and Turkey 
2  The World Bank's  World Development  Report identifies  24 countries as 
Low—Income Sub—Saharari  Africa and  10 more  as  (lower)  middle—income 
Sub—Saharan  Afrrca. 3  A reduction  in the  private  sector  financlal deficco 'L.i ccc.  car.  aso 
improve  the  current  account  deficit.  "nere  this  can  ce  achieved 
through  an  increase  in the savings rate,  it wdll  it. zeneral be  veicome. 
In many of  the  poorer developing  countries,  the  scope  for  this  is 
rather  limited.  A reduction  in the  private  sector  financial  deficit 
through  a cut  in private  sector capital  formation  is unlikely to  be 
desirable, 
4  Again this  ought  to be called the  increase in  the  (internal)  fiscal 
transfer,  but established  usage  and verbal  hygiene  conflict  here too. 
5  It is assumed  for simplicity  that the interest  rate on foreign exchange 
reserves  is the same as that  on foreign debt, 
6  For sfmplicity  all net external current  transfers  are assumed  cc accrue 
to the government.  This  assumption  is most inappropriate  in the  case 
of private  remittances. 
Qx  QM  and  are domestic  production  of the exportable  good,  the 
importable  good and the mon—traded  good  respectively.  and I°; 
k — PG;  j  XM,N  are  domestic  demands  for  the  three  goods  by  the 
private,  (P), and  public (0)  sectors respectively. 
S  In  the  long  run,  a  smaller  stock  of  external  debt obtained as  the 
res'alt  of a period of cumulative  current account  surpluses  permits  a 
country  to run a sustainable  smaller  trade balance surplus  or a larger 
deficit. 
9  Note that C  is aggregate  consumption  spending  measured in  GOP units, 
i.e.  tPx0 + PMC + PNCP_1. 
10  Private investment  spending on non—traded  goods is held constant in 
this thought experiment  and the next one involving  changes  in public 
spending  on non—traded  goods. 11  The  production  of  exportables  need  not  fa.  absou:ev.  as  in 
Figure  2A. 
12  Given  the volume and the  composition  of the  goverroen:s  exaus:ive 
public  spending programme  on  goods  and  services,  and  ignoring  :he 
distortionary  effects  of  non—lump  sum taxes. 
13  If the money  wage is J, the real consumption  wage m is defined by: 
- 
w  — 
F 
-  -1-c  m 
is the (Cobb—Douglas)  consumer  price  index; T  is the consumer  price 
index  for  traded goods.  3  is  the  share  of  imports  in  traded goods 
spending and &  the  share  of non—traded goods  in  total  consumption 
spending.  If  the non—traded  goods  price is a markup on unit labour 
cost then N  — (l+i)WL/QN where  is the proportional  markup  and  is 
labour employed  in the non—traded  goods  sector.  This  implies 
1-a  _ Q  1! 
1-N(l+) 
If thre are no  intersectoral  differences  in  factor  intensities  (so 
QN/LN  is  independent  of QN) and  if  the  markup is  constant then a 
decline  in  the  relative price of  non—traded goods  lowers  the  real 
consumption  wage.  This will be reinforced  if the average product of 
labour in the non—traded  goods  sector  declines  as N/T  declines  and 
contracts,  which is likely  to happen  if the non—traded  goods sector  is 
relatively  labour  intensive. 
14  Measured  in terms  of foreign  GD?. —50— 
15  In  'long—hand  algebra, 
*fU)n(u)  :du  *  *  *  S  PV(s;tb+a;r -4-y—n)  ittçv)+a (v)e  cv. 
16  Two equivalent  ways of writing  (13) are 
— E(s)F*(s) 
PV{s;  TB  r*  + 
and 
— F*(s) — 
PV{s; 
+ A*; j*1 
Equation  (13) has the current  real  value of the  external  debt matched 
by the present  discounted  value  of future  real primary  surpluses,  using 
the  real  exchange—rate—depreciation—corrected  foreign  real  interest 
rate r* +  to  discount  the  future  primary real surpluses.  Ecuation 
(13")  has  the current  foreign  currency  value of the nations external 
debt  matched by  the  present discounted value  of  future  primary 
surpluses  measured in  foreign  currency,  using  the  foreign nominal 
interest  rate  i*  r* + *  to  discount the  future  primary  'foreign 
currency  surpluses. 
17  Technically,  the condition  is: 
1• 





urn — E(r)F*(r)e 
P(r) 
or —1  j*(u)du 
lirn  —  F*()e 
18  I am  concerned  with solvency  only,  not with  op:ima  cr tine—consistent 
borrowing  strategies,  t  may  well  be  opt:ma.,  inder  certain 
conditions,  to run current account  surpluses  or even to become a net 
external  creditor. 
19  This section draws on Buiter  1983,  1985'  and Anand and van ijnbergen 
[1987]. 
20  Depending  on the accounting  conventions  one adopts, J could include the 
operating  surpluses  (deficits)  of  the  state  enterprise  sector. 
Alternatively  one could include  these  in 7'.  Note  that  it is  cash 
returns  that enter  into the accounts  through p. not the implicit  social 
rate  of return. 
21  There again  is a transversality  or terminal  condition  to get from (16) 
to  (19> given by 
lim d(r)exp(_I[r*(u)(u)_n(u))du) 
- 0 
22  For simplicity  r — Qand i —  —  in  Figure  6. FIGURE 
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DQmestie income  19.6  19.9  30.5  31.4  34.0  33.3 
Individual  (9.9)  (9.6)  (9.4)  (10.7)  (26.4)  (26.2) 
Corporate  (8.4)  (8.4)  (13.1)  (13.5)  (7.3)  (7.1) 
Other  direct taxes  7.9  7.3  18.5  17.0  31,7  33.2 
Social  security  (1.0)  (2.2)  (12.9)  (10.1)  (28.2)  (29 2) 
Property  (3.4)  (2.5)  (2.8)  (2,6)  (2.2)  (1.6) 
Domestic  commodity  29.0  35.8  26.6  30.8  29.5  30.6 
Sales,  VAT,  turnover  (11.1)  (18.8)  (7.9)  (10.5)  (16.0)  (16.6) 
Excises  (11.1)  (13.1)  (13.1)  (13.3)  (10.9)  (11.1) 
International  trade  43.6  37.0  24.4  20.8  4.5  2.9 
Import  (32.9)  (32.6)  (19.6)  (16.2)  (4.4)  (2.7) 
Export  (7.7)  (3.8)  (3.5)  (1.4)  (0.1)  (0.2) 
6otes: 
a.  Figures  are unweighted  representing  the average  pattern for countries 
in the sample. 
b.  Figures for subcategories  do not add up to the figure  for each category 
due to the presence of smaller unallocated  taxes. 
c.  Low—income  sample  includes  eleven  countries. 
d.  Middle—income  sample  includes  thirty—six  countries. 
e.  Industrial  market includes  nineteer. countries, 
Source:  Government  Finance  Statistics. —— 
TABLE  2 
Some  estimates  of capital  flizht  in new indus:tia  :r:ss 
Billiotis US.$ 
1979  1980  1981  1982  1987.  1934 
Argentina  2.2  3.5  5  73  1  3  —3.4 
Brazil  1.3  2.0  —  1 3  .5  .4 
Korea  —0.5  —0.7  —0  3  4  5 
Mexico  —1.1  2.2  2.6  4.'  9.3  2.6 
Philippines  0 '7  —'7.1  13  4.4  —1.5  —1.8 
Venezuela  3.0  4.8  5.-i  3.2  3.1  4.0 
Notes:  These estimates  use Wm,  Cline's  definition  of capital flight as 
computed  by Cutnby  and Levich. 
Source:  Cumby and Levich  (1987). —60— 
TABLES 
Revenue from  seignorage  on currency  Sn seected  countries 
(average  1980—85) 
Seignorage 
revenues  Ratio  of  Currency 
(increase  in  currency  growth  Inflation 
currency  as  holdings  (per cent)  (per cent) 
per cent  to GDP  per year  per vest 
of  GDP)  (per cent) 
High seignorage  revenues 
Argentina  4.0  3.8  269  274 
Bolivia  6.2  6.1  438  306 
Ghana  2.2  6.1  45  54 
Sierra  Leone  2.4  7.7  35  43 
Moderate seignorage  revenues 
Brazil  1.0  1.4  129  147 
Israe].  1.1  1.3  165  181 
Mexico  1.5  3.7  50  58 
Peru  1.9  3.1  92  97 
Curkey  1.2  3.8  38  46 
Low seignorage  revenues 
Bangladesh  0.6  4.0  16  12 
Colombia  0.8  4.7  18  22 
Cote d'Ivoire  0.7  9.2  8  7 
Dominican  Republic  0.7  4.6  16  15 
Korea  0.5  4.3  13  9 
Nigeria  0.8  7.2  13  16 
Venezuela  0.4  4.5  8  12 
Notes:  The first  column is calculated  as the end—of—year  currency  outside 
banks (IFS  line l4a)  minus  the  end—of—year  value of the  previous 
year,  divided by the current  year GDP.  The  second column is the 
ratio  of the average  of beginning—of—year  and end—of—year  currency 
outside banks to current  GDP.  The third column is the percentage 
change  in currency outside  banks from end—of—year  to end—of—year. 
The final column is  the  percentage change in CPI  (IFS  line 64) 
from December  to December.  The geometric  average  of growth rates 
is  used  for  columns  three  and  four;  the  arithmetic average  aS 
ratios is used for columns  I and 2. 
Source:  IFS REFERENCES 
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